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Abstract
In his late writings, Michel Foucault submits Enlightenment rationality
to critical re-appropriation. As my analysis will point out, Foucault
finds support for his re-interpretation of Kant's Enlightenment
thinking in the "low modernity" of Charles Baudelaire, notably in his
writings on dandyism and modernity. Although it is a question of one
more history, Foucault's interest is not restricted to the past. Rather,
his analysis opens up the question of the limitations of personal
freedom in the present, too, inviting those disadvantaged by it to
develop critical aesthetic strategies to effect changes in their
existential condition. This critical inquiry, as I will point out, parallels
in many respects the current feminist debate on gender, sexuality,
aesthetics of the self, and freedom.
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1. Introduction
This article discusses Michel Foucault's relation to modernity,
especially his insights into Kant's notion of 'Enlightenment' and
Charles Baudelaire's modern ideas of the 'aesthetics of the self'
(dandyism). In my reading of Foucault's thinking, I will focus
specifically on his late work on the aesthetics of the self - an issue
that has received surprisingly little attention so far, even among
aestheticians.[1]
The overriding emphasis of my investigation is on the question, How
does Foucault's late theorizing on the aesthetics of the self interact
with the focus in Kant's Enlightenment philosophy on the
emancipation of the individual and with developments in modern
aesthetics aimed at overcoming the isolation and alienation of the
modern subject (urban, rational, productive) by turning his or her life
into a work of art?
In my analysis of these issues, I attempt to identify some structural
features at the core of Foucault's late aesthetic thinking. I will argue,
for example, that his late writings on aesthetics do not simply reject
Enlightenment values (as his early archaeological writings clearly do),
but rather rework some of its central categories, such as the
interrelated notions of the self, autonomy and emancipation.[2]
Paying attention to the connections between Foucault's late
aesthetics and Kant's thinking is also to re-assess the thesis often
made of Foucault, that he is an anti-Enlightenment thinker.[3]
Moreover, I will propose that when analysed in the context of
modernity, Foucault's late aesthetics offers a new version of
Enlightenment rationality. This is largely so, I suggest, because
Foucault's late aesthetic thinking is directed not only at Kant's "high"
rational ideals but also at the "low modernity" of the French poet and
aesthetician Charles Baudelaire. Like Kant, who claims that we must
engage in a constant critique of the world around us and of ourselves
if we are to reach a more mature stage of existence and individual
autonomy, the Baudelairean modern aesthetics demands that
individuals start to reflect critically on their own era and their
individual selves. As I demonstrate, it is largely on the grounds of
these specifically modern ideas that Foucault creates his own critical
views on the aesthetic subject, the Enlightenment and the critical
aesthetics of the self.

Towards the end of this article, I will also consider Foucault's late
theorizing from the viewpoint of feminist inquiry. As I will show, his
thought parallels contemporary feminist theory in its attempt to redefine and politicise the subject of the Enlightenment. Yet, it is also
in this context that I will make some critical comments on Foucault's
late work. Following the lines of contemporary feminist thought, I will
focus my attention especially on the relation of gender performances
and sexualising power, and try to find out its position in modern
theories of the subject and aesthetics of the self, an issue that is
somewhat problematic in Foucault's own account as well.
My primary aim is not to record some possible chauvinism in Foucault
or in any other male thinker, however. Rather, I intend to point out
where critical feminist re-visioning of the philosophical
reconsideration of the notion of the aesthetics of the self is needed,
and how this re-visioning is practised in the work of some
contemporary feminist intellectuals.
2. Foucauldian enlightenment: the pluralization of reason
When Foucault's aesthetic theorizations are considered in the context
of Enlightenment thought and Kant's philosophy, a set of counterarguments immediately arises. Was it not exactly the unpleasant
underside of Kantian Enlightenment that Foucault was dedicated to
exposing in his early archaeological work, notably in his critique of
Cartesian rationality and its exclusion of the 'other' from the history
of the rational 'same'?
What about the subject who was described earlier by genealogical
Foucault as primarily a product of discourse and knowledge-power
relations, and who was not supposed to reach any autonomous or
authentic stage, and not even to talk about the process of
enlightenment? How can the same subject suddenly start to test the
limits of himself, and even the world around him?
There are good reasons to pose these critical questions. For it is true
that Foucault had fought with Kantian Enlightenment and humanist
views on man since The Order of Things (1966), criticizing not only
the credibility of rationality and progress but also the very idea of the
autonomous and true subject who was to free her/himself from the
domination of others and become mature.[5]
There was, however, at least one significant reason for him to turn
towards the tradition of the Enlightenment in his late aesthetics. I
suggest that this reason was linked to his attempt to construct a
more developed view of the individual's possibilities to effect changes
in his/her self as well as in his/her historical situation - a view for
which the heritage of the Enlightenment offers many useful tools.
In a piece entitled "What is Enlightenment?," which took its cue and
its title from an essay of Kant's published in November 1784 by the
liberal Berliner Monatschrift, Foucault imagines that Kant's famous
question, What is Enlightenment?, ( Was ist Aufklärung? ) is posed to
him two centuries later. In his interpretation of Kant's text, Foucault
gives special attention to Kant's way of defining enlightenment by the
term Ausgang, a way out or an exit, which Foucault sees as
presenting the birth of the modern subject.
Kant indicates that "the way out" characteristic of enlightenment is a
process that releases us from a state of tutelage or immaturity (
Unmündigkeit). By tutelage he means a state of mind that makes us
accept someone else's authority. According to Kant, individuals
usually remain in tutelage because they are idle and suffer from a
lack of courage. With these critical notions in mind, Kant formulates
his famous definition of Enlightenment:
"Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage.
Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his reason without direction

from another. Self-incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in
lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without
direction from another. Sapere aude! "Have courage to use your own
reason!" - that is the motto of enlightenment."[6]
For Kant, it is only through the legitimate use of reason that the
individual's autonomy can be assured. In this sense, as Foucault
claims, the Enlightenment is the age of the critique.[7] With this idea
in mind, in his late writings Foucault retains from Enlightenment
thinking exactly the notion of the subject's rational autonomy and
places it at the heart of his theory of the aesthetics of the self. Just
like Kant, he considers this notion essential to the individual's ability
to exercise critical judgement, free from dominant beliefs, norms and
desires.
Yet, Foucault's position also differs in some important respects from
that of Kant. First, he emphasizes that the criticism inherent in this
critical work is no longer to be used in the search for formal (Kantian)
structures with a universal value. Instead, he considered the task of
Enlightenment thinking to be to make an historical investigation into
those particular events that have led us to constitute ourselves and
to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are thinking, doing and
saying.
Second, unlike Kant, who sees the Enlightenment as the exit of
man's self-imposed tutelage, Foucault stresses that we must
acknowledge that the process of enlightenment is (and always was)
just one more discursive paradigm, or one of those shifting orders of
language or representation that make up the structural genealogy of
Western reason.[8] Therefore, his own work does not orient the
process of analysis toward "the essential kernel of rationality" that is
assumed to be found during the process of enlightenment. On the
contrary, critical thinking, in Foucault's view, must be directed toward
the "contemporary limits of the necessary," that is, toward what is
not or is no longer indispensable for the constitution of ourselves as
autonomous subjects.[9]
In Foucault's version of enlightenment, the individual subject's
rational autonomy is not bound up with the idea of the unified
rational subject. Far from it, for, as he saw it, there exists multiple
and historically specific forms of rationality, due to which reason can
never discover its essence or founding act, but only "different
modifications in which rationalities engender one another, oppose
and pursue one another."[10]
This plurality of reasons does not necessarily mean that individuals
may not use their reason to criticize other rational practices in public.
In other words, by pluralizing reason Foucault is not arguing that
"anything goes." For him, the pluralization of reason and critique is
rather a necessary moment in the formation of individual autonomy,
but such critique cannot be grounded on universal common reason
because this would ignore individual differences as well as the
elements of rational disintegration within the subject itself and within
reason. So conceived, the main problem of Enlightenment thought for
Foucault is not so much in preserving the primacy of reason (as in
Kant and the intellectualist communication theory of Jürgen
Habermas, for example), or in the domination of nature (Schiller),
but rather in the attempt to react to one's historical situation in a
critical and creative manner.
This critical "ontology of the present," as Foucault also terms it, has
two separate but related components: it demands work on oneself
(ontology of ourselves), and responding critically to one's time and
surroundings (ontology of the present time).[11] I will describe
shortly the main contents of this differentiation in the following
section.

3. Ontology of the present and ourselves
In his presentation of the idea of the ontology of the present,
Foucault mentions three axes, the specificity of and interconnections
among which have to be analysed if we are to grasp something of the
questions "Who are we?" and "What is our own era?" These are the
axis of knowledge, the axis of power, and the axis of ethics.
According to Foucault, the historical ontology of ourselves has to
provide answers to an open series of questions. It has to make an
indefinite number of inquiries, which might be specified and
multiplied, but which will all, in one way or another, address the
following important issues: How are we constituted as subjects of our
own knowledge? How are we constituted as subjects who exercise
and submit to power relations? How are we constituted as moral
subjects of our own actions? [12]
Elsewhere, Foucault describes this sort of question as a diagnosis of
"what today is." This diagnosis does not consist in some simple
characterization of what we are, but rather demands us to follow "the
lines of fragility in the present - in managing to grasp why and how
that which is might no longer be that which is."[13] In more concrete
terms, Foucault demands that all critical thinking analyze freedom as
concrete and historically limited, that is, as a site of concretely
possible transformation. This work could also be described as the
microphysics of power, because it represents attempts to clarify what
forms of rationality are involved in the process of domination and
how knowledge is used as a technique of power.
The primary site of this sort of (positive) critical analysis and
transformation in Foucault's later thinking is the individual self. For
him, realizing one's freedom consists, first of all, in one's willingness
to face the idea that action is not grounded in universal and
ahistorical theories of the individual subject, any more than it is in
the conditions of community and speaking, but that it demands
active agency on the part of an individual.
For Kant, the Enlightenment and autonomy consisted, at least in
part, in one's mature use of reason defined as the moment when
humanity will "put its own reason to use, without subjecting itself to
any authority," as Foucault comments.[14] Similarly, for Foucault,
the notion of the mature, autonomous use of reason is used as the
basis of the critique that is directed towards an investigation of the
self, which he nevertheless takes as a historical and practical entity
rather than as ontologically and transcendentally given.
Yet, the aim of Foucauldian autonomy is not to achieve a state of
impersonal moral transcendence, but rather to refuse to submit to
the "government of individualization" by constantly questioning what
seems to be natural and inevitable in one's own identity: an
interrogation of the "contemporary limits of the necessary."[15] For
him, the subject is autonomous in the sense that it is capable of
critique, but this critique has no purely transcendental or ahistorical
value because it is always historically situated and contextual.
Therefore, as Foucault states, "The historical ontology of ourselves
must turn away from all projects that claim to be global or radical,"
for we know from experience that "the claim to escape from the
system of contemporary reality so as to produce the overall programs
of another society, of another way of thinking, another culture,
another vision of the world, has led only to the return of the most
dangerous traditions".[16] So conceived, the ethos of the
Enlightenment is not faithfulness to doctrinal elements, but rather
"the permanent reactivation of an attitude - that is, of a philosophical
ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of our
historical era."[17]
Yet, the critical question soon arises that if Foucault does not even
attempt to provide universally valid norms for human action and

morality, how can we avoid the situation in which the subject who
commits crimes, rapes or kills, for example, is merely considered to
be realizing his/her freedom and creating a unique aesthetics of the
self?[18] From where, in other words, can we seek moral criteria for
action if the only critical basis we have is that individual autonomy
tests the limits of the self and the present? This is not an easy
question, as Foucault himself acknowledges in his essay on the
Enlightenment. For if we limit ourselves to exclusively partial and
local inquiry (such as studying the individual practices of the self), we
seem to run the risk of letting ourselves be determined by some
more general structures over which we have no control, and of which
we may even not be conscious.[19]
Foucault offers two solutions to this dilemma. First, he suggests that
we need to give up hope of acceding to a point of view that would
give us access to complete and definitive knowledge of what may
constitute our historical limits. In other words, Foucault suggests that
we cannot grasp the whole of our historical time, but we can
construct a valid perspective on our era, as well as on our selves.[20]
Second, he emphasizes that this does not mean that we cannot do
any work except in disorder and contingency, and that the work on
our limits (practices of the self) also has a certain generality,
systematicity and homogeneity.[21] Despite the engaged and
historicist character of his thinking, Foucault retains some notion of
transcendence in the sense that he sees us as being able to go
beyond the limits that have been imposed on us historically.
In the light of these notions, Foucault concludes that it is better to
prefer the very specific transformations that might, for example,
concern our ways of being and thinking, our relations to authority,
and the ways in which we usually perceive sexuality, insanity or
illness. With this in mind, he characterizes the philosophical ethos
that is appropriate to his critical ontology of ourselves as "a historicopractical test of the limits that we may go beyond, and thus as work
carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings."[22]
As a concrete example of this sort of critical work on subjectivity and
the present, he refers to Baudelaire's consciousness of modernity as
"the ephemeral, the fleeting, and the contingent."[23] In Foucault's
view, Baudelaire's modernity is both a form of relationship to the
present and a mode of relationship that one has to establish with
oneself. To be modern in the Baudelairean sense is not to accept
oneself as one is in the flux of passing moments. What it demands
instead is a certain asceticism and active aesthetic self-shaping. As
Foucault points out, it is this taking of oneself as an object of
complex and difficult elaboration that Baudelaire, in the spirit of his
day, called "dandyism."
4. Dandyism
Foucault's interest in bringing together the critical aspects of the
Kantian Enlightenment and Baudelaire's notion of modernity might,
at first sight, seem surprising. However, it should be noted that, just
as the idea of the Enlightenment is not restricted by Kant to his own
time, Baudelairean modernity should not be regarded as a mere
periodizing label, despite its strong historical connections to late19th-century European reality and aesthetics. What Baudelaire
means by modernity is each present in its presentness, in other
words, the present in its purely instantaneous quality (doomed to
become antiquity in the future), which also contains an element of
the eternal (or classical). In this sense, as Foucault bears out,
Baudelaire's analysis of modernity contains elements that are
applicable to various other historical phases of modernity as well,
including our own time.
Foucault approves of Baudelaire's analysis of modernity for two
reasons. First, he is interested in Baudelaire's way of defining it in

terms of the discontinuity of time. At this level, Baudelairean
modernity represents for him a certain break with tradition, a feeling
of novelty or vertigo in the face of the fleeting moment. However, as
Foucault points out, these ephemeral, fleeting and contingent aspects
of the present are also connected to another aspect of modernity in
Baudelaire's work, namely, to the attempt to recapture something
eternal in this very present. This eternality is not, in Foucault's (or in
Baudelaire's) view, something that goes beyond the present time,
however. Rather, it is to be found within the present instant.[24] In
other words, I understand that Foucault means by this sort of
eternity something like a fallen transcendence or some sort of
historicized universal (as Sartre would call it).
Second, Foucault finds in Baudelaire's writings a model of the modern
art of the self, and understands this model as a mode of relationship
that has to be established with oneself. He also refers to "the
deliberate attitude of modernity" in Baudelaire's work, which is "tied
to an indispensable asceticism."[25] The famous Baudelairean
spokesperson for this sort of modern attitude is the dandy, or, almost
synonymously with him, the flâneur/modern artist. What this partly
fictive, partly real Baudelairean modern man aims at - and what
interests Foucault in his character - is an individual attempt to
cultivate the idea of modern beauty in his personality, to satisfy his
passions, to feel, and to think.[26]
On this level, modernity for Baudelaire represents a new kind of
existential "cult of oneself" (culte de soi-même), which is based on
ideas of disinterestedness (dandyism as a manifestation of social
inactivity and non-utilitarian liberty), and on attempts to constantly
bring forth one's originality in relation to one's own historical era.[27]
For the Baudelairean flâneur, the city streets function as transitory
stages of modern life on which those who seek modernity can find
living expressions of actual beauty, be this expressed in fashion,
gestures or human faces, or just simply in the heterogeneity of the
crowd.[28] This modern beauty is not conventional and pretty,
however, but rather discontinuous, fleeting, bizarre and strange. In
this sense, it could be seen as offering space for differences and
ruptures, or perhaps more appropriately, ruptures and discontinuities
are to be seen as its essential traits.
As we find in the writings of Baudelaire, on the formal level, modern
artistic achievements depend upon individual innovation in language
and in modes of representation. Modern art, so conceived, can speak
to eternity only by freezing time and all its fleeting elements.[29] For
Baudelaire, however, the historical, affective and transitory ("low")
dimension of modernity was even more important than the eternal
and immutable (high, classical) aspect of art, given his belief that
eternal beauty exists only as an abstraction, or as a "general surface
of diverse beauties." He also considered the particular and fleeting
element of modern beauty more challenging in that it grows from our
individual passions: in Baudelaire's view, it is due to the particular
nature of our passions that we have our own specific conceptions of
beauty.[30]
Being part of low rather than high (Kantian, rational) modernity,
dandyism was for Baudelaire an example of the specifically modern
attitude of making one's body, behavior, passions, and existence a
work of art. As Foucault stresses, a dandy is nevertheless not a
perfect being, nor does he have any specifically modern essence. He
is rather an individual who is aware of the historical limits of himself
and his situation, but who tries to invent himself as a kind of
transgression of these limits. [31] Therefore, Baudelaire's modernity
does not liberate man in his own being, but rather compels him to
face the task of producing himself.[32] In other words, modern man
is not going off to discover himself, his truth, and his hidden inner
secrets, but he rather tries to invent himself through creating his
personal aesthetics of the self.

What this also means, is that to be modern in the Baudelairean sense
is to choose to be modern. It is, first of all, a question of a new
attitude or sensuousness, manifested in one's critical relation to the
present era. At the same time, I suggest that for Baudelaire (as well
as for Foucault), the modern attitude represented a new form of
existential heroism, because the path to modernity is difficult: it is
full of uncertainties and risks. This uncertainty is largely due to the
imaginative and contingent nature of modern man's creation:
modernity or the "present in its presentness" is not a reality to be
copied by the artist, but far more a work of his or her own
imaginative creation by which he or she penetrates beyond the
banality of observable appearances where eternity and ephemerality
are one.
Moreover, what I wish to emphasize, by taking up Foucault's
connections to the low modernity of Baudelaire, is that for Baudelaire
the modern cult of the self was, first of all, a manifestation of the
culture of difference. In other words, a true dandy does not follow
any given rules, laws or norms, nor does he care for official values
such as money, conformism, heterosexuality and marriage.[33]
Despising the limits of common sense, and the typical or normal, the
dandy creates his own aesthetics of the self, which is dedicated to
useless passions and extreme leisure.
On this level, the dandy is a perfect example of individual alienation
from society and official culture. His enchantment also expresses a
certain revolt against bourgeois and capitalist values with their
rationalized and utilitarian lifestyle ideals. Moreover, the dandy's
aesthetic cultivation of the self is also politically and socially
transgressive: it is meant to illuminate the limits that society places
on individuals, and to test these limits by doing things differently imaginatively and often without any other useful purpose than one's
personal pleasure and aesthetic satisfaction.
5. The body as a site of artistic creation
One more important aspect of Baudelaire's modern aesthetics of the
self for the analysis at hand - an aspect that Foucault for some
reason ignores in his reading of Baudelaire's writings - is that his
modern reflexivity of the self pervasively affects not only one's
psychic processes or gestures but also the experience of the body.
Let me illustrate briefly what I mean by this statement.
In Baudelaire's texts on dandyism, the body could not function
outside of the internally referential systems of modernity.[34] As
Baudelaire's writings clearly evidence, the body of the dandy is itself
reflexively mobilized: he conceives of it as some sort of raw aesthetic
materiality that has to be cultivated into a work of art. What this also
means is that, in the aestheticist culture of dandyism, the body
becomes torn apart from all images of nature. This separation is well
echoed in the writings of some other analysers of dandyism as well.
To cite the words of Oscar Wilde: "The first duty in life is to be as
artificial as possible," hence his conclusion: "One should either be a
work of art, or wear a work of art."[35] Or, as Baudelaire puts it,
asserting that because nature does not provide us with morality,
"everything that is good is always a product of art/skills ( d'art)."
Therefore, in Baudelaire's view, morality, just like beauty, should be
grounded on the "order of the beautiful" rather than on nature.[36]
In Baudelaire's texts, the dandy serves both as the creator and the
object of his art. The aesthetic cultivation he practices on his body is
meant to transform his art into an art of living, and his style into a
personal style of living.[37] The primal point of interest in the
dandy's search for happiness is thus his own body, understood as an
artificial work of art that is to take over the naturally beautiful. Much
the same as in Greco-Roman cultures, this demands some aesthetic

moderation on the individual's part. Examples of this self-control are
to be found, for example, in the 19th century dandy's admiration of
slenderness and in his use of corsets, which squeezed the body so
tightly that the famous dandy Barbey d'Aurevilly once blurted out to
Baudelaire: "If I were to partake in Holy Communion, I'd blow up"
["Si je communiais, j'éclaterais"].[38]
These principles of nineteenth-century aestheticism might at first
sight appear as a movement towards the narcissistic cultivation of
one's bodily appearance. The question is not quite that simple,
however. As Anthony Giddens points out, the modern interest in the
aesthetic cultivation of one's personality and body could also be seen
as the expression of a much more deeply-rooted concern to actively
construct and control the body.[39] For here we can also see an
integral connection between work on the body and lifestyle manifest, for example, in the dieting and exhibitionist dressing of
dandies.
Another typically modern example is the cultivation of the sexual
characteristics of the body, also frequently referred to in Baudelaire's
descriptions of the androgynous gender of dandies.[40] By cultivating
the sexual body as a site of aesthetic re-creation, a dandy represents
a culture of difference and differentiation. His aesthetics of the self, in
this sense, becomes the basis, or, perhaps better, the essential
means of testing the limits of the present and "ourselves" and at the
same time manifesting not only an individual lifestyle, but also one's
philosophical, moral and political attitudes toward present society.
Despite the fact that the dandy's critical action is grounded far more
on individual passions and feelings than on reason, his critical project
also seems to be, in some respects, close to the Kantian subject of
enlightenment. For both Kant and Baudelaire seek the autonomy of
the modern subject in the context of the present, attempting to free
individuals from the normative and materialist chains of society, as
well as from religion, moralism and tradition. Both of them also
repeat another essential characteristic of enlightenment thought,
namely the idea that nature must be overcome in order to become
"mature." In the process of creating a modern aesthetics of the self,
nature thus becomes a sort of negative other, a dark reverse side of
the enlightenment process that an autonomous individual attempts to
re-shape and control through various aesthetic practices. Yet, it is
also crucial to note that the critical re-shaping of one's aesthetics of
existence has come to mean somewhat different things for Baudelaire
and Kant. I will discuss these differences in the following section in
terms of two different interpretations of the term 'modernity': high
and low.
6. The aesthetic subject: on the edges of high and low
As was the case with Kant, Foucault does not merely repeat the
views of Baudelaire, but rather attempts to create a new version of
Enlightenment rationality on the grounds of Baudelaire's thinking.
Actually, for Foucault, the "enlightened" aesthetics of the self
includes both the rationalist high dimension of Kant's thinking and
the low affective side of Baudelaire's aesthetics.
Thus considered, Foucault's late analysis of the aesthetic subject
does not ignore the importance of reason for individual aesth/ethics
and political autonomy, as Baudelaire does in some respects. Yet it
acknowledges the importance of the body, affectiveness and the
everyday life in critical thought and action - all aspects of subjectivity
that are largely lacking in Kant's more rational account. In this
respect, his late theorizations of the aesthetics of the self can be said
to offer a new version of enlightenment rationality.
We could express the same idea by saying that, when coming to
terms with rationality and Enlightenment thought, Foucault links

together two different aspects of modernity and enlightenment.
Following Scott Lash's and Jonathan Friedman's analysis, I use the
expression "high modernity" or "high modernist subjectivity" to refer
to a version of identity that assigns extraordinary privilege to
judgement and especially to cognition, and devalues,
correspondingly, the aspects of the libidinal, affective, body, touch,
and the faculty of perception, so that vision itself is, so to speak,
"colonized by reason."[41]
In the face of this, the so-called "low modernist" alternatives stress
instead experimental living, change and movement, as well as the
bodily level of existence, including aspects of sexuality, desire and
pleasure. Like high modernity, low modernity works toward an ethics,
but as Lash and Friedman remark, "an ethics without blueprints." For
its universalism is "one which fosters cosmopolitanism, but
cosmopolitanism without emancipation."[42]
As these terminological differentiations concerning modernity already
suggest, there are some crucial differences between Kant's and
Baudelaire's critical insights - differences that I am convinced must
be taken up in order to fully understand Foucault's position in this
specifically modern network of ideas. I will emphasize three points in
my analysis of these differences.
First, the critical task in the Baudelairean (and Foucauldian)
aesthetics of the self is not to construct universally valid structures of
reason. What Baudelaire was aiming at, I suggest, was to recognize
the modern individual as a non-determined subject who has the
power to test the limits that society and others place on the self (the
requirement to be rational, to marry, to produce, to rationalize
relations between work and leisure, art and life, for example). What
Foucault finds valuable in this account is that this critical quest leads
Baudelaire to stress the importance of autonomous self-government
and aesthetic self-creation rather than universal structures of reason.
Second, unlike Kant, who guides the modern subject to follow the
"high" lines of reason, the Baudelairean modern subject tends to turn
toward the aesthetic cultivation of the "low," that is, the body,
passions and sexuality. This low interest in human life reasserts itself
against the high modernist cult of reasoning and civilizing by different
means. It emphasizes the importance of aestheticist perception and
the aesthetic stylisation of the self against the modernist
colonialization of perception by our logical faculties[43], it turns
toward tactile and passionate alternatives to cognitivist assumptions
of high modernity, and it produces a template for the modern
unconscious that tends to reassert itself against the high modernist
civilization process.[44] I suggest that, in this respect Foucault is on
much the same lines as Baudelaire, notably when coming to terms
with the experimental body, limit-attitudes and the aesthetics of the
self.
The third difference between Baudelaire's and Kant's critical
modernities is in their different viewpoints on historical progress.
What connects Kant's essay on the Enlightenment with Baudelaire's
dandyism is, in Foucault's view, the fact that the promesse de
bonheur (promise of reconciliation or happiness) of both thinkers is
embedded in the promise of critique. Yet, I contend that, at the same
time, there are some significant differences between the two, which
are worth taking up here so that we may better understand the
specific character of Foucault's own interpretation of the terms
'modernity' and 'Enlightenment'. What I particularly have in mind
here is that, unlike in Kant, the promise of reconciliation in
Baudelaire's modern aesthetics is not rooted in the individual's public
usage of reason. Instead, the possibility of redemption or
reconciliation is actualised in the aesthetic constitution of what he
simply calls 'modernity' or 'modern subjectivity.'

Altogether, for both Kant and Baudelaire modernity represents an
individually chosen attitude and ethos that arises out of and is at the
same time an attempt to respond critically to one's own historical
situation. What has changed on the road from German idealism to
Baudelaire's mid-nineteenth-century aesthetics is the spirit of rational
optimism inherent in Kant's thought. Whereas Kant's essay on the
Enlightenment still promotes reliance on rational reasoning and
universally valid statements, Baudelaire's modern aesthetics of the
self has turned passionate, tragic, historically embedded and sad.
Neither do his modern heroes manifest the same belief in progress
and promesse de bonheur as Kant's modern heroes, scholars and
academically trained men of genius do. Rather, he concentrates on
searching for fleeting experiences of modernity. In Baudelaire's texts,
such experiences are more often found on the dirty faces of rag-andbone men, beggar-girls and prostitutes than on the scrubbled faces
of well-educated upper class scholars, the Kantian spokespersons of
the Enlightenment. In this respect, I suggest that Baudelaire's
position, like Foucault's, is far more low, popular and avant-garde
than the high aesthetics of Kant and his followers.
The same lack of reconciliation is also to be found in Baudelaire's and
Foucault's notions of modern art. While in the late 18th century
writings of Kant the aesthetic subject might still experience
reconciliation and wholeness by referring to the organic character of
an artwork, the application of reason and the universal validity of
aesthetic judgement, the low modern subjectivity of Baudelaire and
Foucault remains without reconciliation despite the modern subject's
constant attempts to find "a way out" of or "an exit" from the
limitations imposed on one's existence.
As Baudelaire suggests, the more remote from everyday life modern
art becomes, the more it withdraws into complete aesthetic
autonomy and the more painfully the lack of reconciliation is brought
to conscious awareness. The same pain is reflected in the endless
ennui of the Baudelairean outsider (a dandy) who identifies himself
with Parisian rag-and-bone men, beggar girls and prostitutes. Like
Foucault in his analysis of madmen and homosexuals, Baudelaire
sees in these figures examples of modern heroism, which
nevertheless does not lead to reconciliation or happiness.[45]
Unlike Kant, Foucault and Baudelaire thus doubt the success of the
process of enlightenment. As Foucault remarks, "I do not know
whether we will ever reach mature adulthood."[46] This belief is also
echoed in his argument that, despite the possibility to create a critical
aesthetics of the self and to effect changes in social conditions, we
can never become totally free because freedom is not a fixed state of
being. For Foucault, freedom is far more a name that can be ascribed
to our possibilities to create ourselves and transgress the limits
imposed on us by society and others, not in the sense of overcoming
these limits, but as illuminating and critically testing them.
Foucault is also well aware of the fact that everyone's personal
aesthetics of the self necessarily includes being moulded by various
outside forces and attempting to fashion others. Thus, despite one's
efforts to create an individual or "free" aesthetics of the self, one
remains tied to control mechanisms and outside forces. In Foucault's
view, this should not make us passive, however, for to abandon selfcreating is to abandon the craving for freedom, and to let go of the
hold upon one's self, even if it is a self based on fiction, is to die.[47]
There is thus a need for techniques of aesthetic self-empowerment,
because they support individual freedom and might help individuals
to become freer from domination by the other.[48] Because of their
critical function, aesthetic practices of the self are not confined to
aesthetics, but are also essentially part of one's personal ethics,
politics and freedom.

7. Contemporary politics of the self: sexuality and identity
Despite the fact that Foucault terms his inquiries "histories," his work
on the aesthetic practices of the self deals with our contemporary
reality in many different ways. As he demonstrates in The Use of
Pleasures (1984), the normalizing society (in which we all
undoubtedly live) is the historical outcome of technologies of power
that are centred on life. Hence, we should not let the idealistic
formulations of various constitutions and codes (claims on freedom,
fraternity and equality, for example) deceive us, nor should we
believe that the laws - which operate more and more as norms that
rule our lives - simply protect us, because it is exactly these juridical
forms that have made an essentially normalizing bio-power
acceptable.[49] Foucault's judgment of modern bio-power is, in a
sense, negative: He believes that we have entered a phase of
juridical regression in comparison with some earlier European
societies we know of (notably those preceding the 17th-century).
In the context of contemporary reality, Foucault's scepticism seems
to be well-founded. Despite the fact that one would think that
women, for example, have gained more freedom of control over their
lives and bodies, modern bio-power manifests itself in many cases in
which women's juridical rights over their own bodies are still a painful
subject of political struggle, be this struggle linked to abortion,
prostitution, sexual abuse, violence or non-heterosexual motherhood.
On another level, it seems that very many women turn their selves
into what Foucault has called "docile bodies," which manifest
obedience to the normalizing power, even at the cost of getting
seriously ill or dying. The contemporary success of plastic surgery,
personal training programs and extreme dieting could be used as
concrete examples of what Foucault means. In modern Western
cultures, individual docility often appears to be manifested through
aestheticized practices of the self, in other words, through aesthetic
practices of appearance that are meant to shape the individual's body
to better meet stereotypical gender ideals. As Susan Bordo observes,
we live in a culture in which "self-starvation, addictive bingeing and
purging, exercise compulsions, and a multi-million dollar industry in
corrective surgery are flourishing." Moreover, it is also a culture that
"inclines us away from systemic and historical understanding of these
practices and the forms of normalization they serve. Instead,
exercise, diet and plastic surgery are continually mystified in
commercial constructions of body alteration as self-determination and
creative self-fashioning."[50]
In other words, there is a huge business in the contemporary West
used for the process of subjection and individualism, but this process
is easily commercialized and aestheticized, and it does not lead to
true individuality but rather to the active self-normalization of the
individual, which Foucault also describes as docility. New modes of
female docility are apparently often linked to the illusion in the form
of commodities and advertisements that provide people with
aesthetic sign language through which to interpret their "unique"
existence in the world. In many cases, this aspect also covers
individual manifestations of sexuality: Many people make use of the
possibility to express their sexual urges, advertising themselves with
the help of commodity aesthetics as individual sexual beings. It is,
however, highly questionable, whether this sort of aesthetic creation
of one's subjectivity and body is anything other than an expression of
cultural docility, or at least quite often this seems to be the case.
In my view, Foucault's late writings on the aesthetics of the self
attempted to develop a critical alternative for this sort of
"aestheticization" of the subject by looking more intensively at
possible forms of active resistance that could strengthen individual
autonomy and also effect changes in social conditions. What he
offers, I suggest, is in some respects a more positive account of the

subject, who might also transgress the limits of bio-power through
the search for alternatives to modern self-subjugation.[51]
Seen in this light, one of the central critical goals of the Foucauldian
aesthetics of the self is to support and strengthen the existential
possibilities of various excluded groups (women and sexual
minorities, for example) to sound out on their own. In this respect,
his aesthetic theorizations have an explicitly political character: They
work to re-define identity as a site for cultural resistance and
individual autonomy that might pave the way for alternative styles of
living and identification.
In a late interview, "Sex, Power, and the Politics of Identity" (1984),
Foucault explicates the importance of the aesthetic practices of the
self for contemporary reality by referring to the homosexual
movement, which is, in his view, much more in need of the art of
existence than of scientific knowledge of sexuality.
"[W]hat the gay movement needs now is much more the art of life
than a science or scientific knowledge (or pseudoscientific
knowledge) of what sexuality is. [. . . ] Sexuality is something that
we ourselves create - it is our creation, and much more than the
discovery of a secret side of our desire. We have to understand that
with our desires, go new forms of relationships, new forms of love,
new forms of creation. Sex is not a fatality: it's a possibility for
creative life."[52]
By defining sexuality in terms of the possibility to live a creative life,
Foucault associates one's sexual practices of the self with creating an
artwork. He suggests that the creative work on one's sexual self
should be part of individual basic rights. In his view, the rights
everyone has in choosing her/his sexuality are not respected enough
in the West, even if the situation improved after the 1960s (the
changes in the medical and juridical definitions of homosexuality, for
example). What still remains to be done is to affirm actively different
sexual choices and forces through creative practices of the self, which
are not created in the mere defense of homosexuals' right to exist.
For Foucault, practices of the self are an important part of sexual
politics of the self, because they work to free sexuality and pleasure
from the chains and restrictions that society and its juridical forms
impose on the individual's constitution of their selves and of sex.[53]
In his view, the liberation of pleasure concerns not only homosexuals,
but also heterosexuals, who are not, in practice, much more free in
the realization of their individual sexual desires.
According to Foucault, concentration on the creative action of each
individual is even much more important than the emphasizing of
one's fixed (homosexual, or any other) identity.[54] This is due to
the fact that practices of the self are creative strategies that can
create a new culture, but this culture cannot be based on the idea of
fixed identity - notably if we, along with Foucault, accept the claim
that there is no essential identity, but only a moving grip of power
relations in and through which individuals continually constitute
themselves. Seen in this way, acts of affirming alternative identities
are significant because they are forms of expression of our critical
work on the limits imposed on individuals/us. In other words, they
enforce individual style in terms of freedom rather than fixed
identities, and thus advocate also social change in the direction of
freedom.
For Foucault, alternative practices of the self, such as homosexuality,
thus represent one form of active resistance. In his late work,
Foucault interprets this sort of resistance as even prior to cultural
domination. As he notes, the moment one ceases to do what one is
expected to do, or transgresses the definitions and limits addressed
to one, one starts to utilize power relations. So conceived, resistance

comes first and remains superior to all other forces inherent in the
struggle for power, for it is resistance that forces power relations to
change. [55] Seen in this way, the aesthetic practices of the self and
practical politics of the self are inseparable.
In the following, I intend to show how Foucault's ideas can be applied
to feminist thinking, on the one hand, and how, on the other hand,
his work requires critique and reformulation when brought together
with feminist insights. Because my intention is not to be simply for or
against Foucault, I have chosen a method of analysis that addresses
the strengths and weaknesses of his thinking at the same time, and
tries to provide some tools for moving beyond him when needed. In
my view, it is only through this sort of "unorthodox" reading of
Foucault, or "moving beyond Foucault," that we might discover the
positive implications of his aesthetics for actual critical theorizations
and practices, and maximize the benefits of his insights for
contemporary critical thought.
8. The advantages of Foucault's late aesthetics for feminism
There are four main points in my analysis of the advantages of
Foucault's late aesthetics for feminist theorizations. First, I maintain
that his idea of the subject's active self-creation, based on the
problematization of straightforward causal connections between
individual practices and either social or natural determinants, brings
his insights closer to the non-reductive analysis of women's status
and identities proposed in recent feminist theory. This emphasis is
important and also practically useful for feminist ends, I suggest,
because it implies that, although there are structures of domination,
notably constructions of gender, that ensure the overall subordinate
position of women in society, in their daily lives many women do not
find themselves simply oppressed, but rather experience that they
exercise an amount of power and influence over other individuals and
themselves.[56] This viewpoint has an effect not only on feminist
political strategies, but also on how women's possibilities for
empowerment and active agency are understood.[57]
The second advantage of Foucault's late aesthetics for feminism
partly overlaps the above notions. It is embedded in his vision that
the individual constitution of identity might be considered as critical
strategy and a way of affirming alternative lifestyles. To put it in
Foucauldian terms, through the formation of a critical ontology of the
self, and through the affirmation of one's personal stylistics of the
self, it becomes possible to formulate an alternative political
standpoint from which individuals, male and female alike, can
actively resist normalizing power and its government of
individualization. At the level of feminist theorization, this idea has
produced new key words, such as contestation, intervention and
subversion. Susan Bordo terms this shift in feminist theory the
"postmodern position":
"Postmodern feminism ... criticizes the 'old' discourse ...for
over-emphasizing ... control, for failing to adequately acknowledge
the creative and resistant responses that continually challenge and
disrupt it. From this post-modern perspective, both the earlier
emphasis on 'social conditioning' and the later move to
'normalization' underestimate the unstable nature of subjectivity and
the creative agency of individuals."
[58]
As Bordo suggests, it is exactly this active "post-modern" agency of
the subject that might confuse dominant discourse and ideology by
creating "gaps" in that discourse. In much the same spirit, Judith
Butler emphasizes in her Gender Trouble(1990) the discursive and
performative character of gender. According to Butler, the internal
core or substance of one's self- and gender is not originally given but

is produced and reproduced through aseries of acts, gestures and
desires that project the self on the surface of the body. However, the
body, or its aesthetic sign language, cannot fully incorporate one's
self. Rather, the self is aesthetically performed through the body,
that is, "through the play of signifying absences that suggest, but
never reveal, the organizing principle of identity as a cause."[59]
Butler explains her view in the following words:
"In a sense, all signification takes place within the orbit of the
compulsion to repeat; 'agency,' then, is to be located within the
possibility of a variation of that repetition. If the rules governing
signification not only restrict, but enable the assertion of alternative
domains of cultural intelligibility, i.e., new possibilities for gender that
contest the rigid codes of hierarchial binarisms, then it is only within
the practices of repetitive signifying that a subversion of identity
becomes possible."[60]
A crucial notion for the analysis at hand is that if gender is seen as a
cultural/aesthetic performance and not as a natural fact, it can also
be criticized, transgressed and altered. In Foucault's terms, it can be
re-made, given that we know how it was made.[61] As Butler shows,
this is well evidenced in all of the parodic cases in which gender
identity is turned into explicit imitation and gender performance, such
as in the cultural practices of drag, cross-dressing and the aesthetic
stylisation of butch/femme sexual identities.
This sort of gender parody is also a common phenomenon in
contemporary subversive art, which often plays with the parodic
representation of gender identity, womanhood, manhood,
heterosexuality, queer practices, and so forth (I'm thinking here of
artists such as Cindy Sherman, Barbara Kruger, Carolee
Schneemann, Jenny Holzer, Hannah Wilke, Heli Rekula and Aurora
Reinhard, for example). The interesting aspect of these
representational gender parodies is, in my view, that they show how
parodic uses of identity can function as occasions for subversive
laughter, and this reveals that normality or sexual naturality are
actually mere copies, ideals that no one can totally embody. What
they also show, is that parodic repetitions of gender might function
as activepolitical practices of resistance by which aesthetic
performers may try to challenge the existing norms and stereotypes
addressed to women or men.
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By showing that gender is nothing but a series of acts that demands
repetition, the whole notion is opened up to self-parody, break-up,
self-criticism, and "those hyperbolic exhibitions of 'the natural' that,
in their very exaggeration, reveal its fundamentally phantasmatic
status," as Butler comments.[62]
Individual style, in this context, comes to represent a name for what
individuals seek to enhance, nurture or shelter even when they
attack sexual regimes. To cite the words of the Foucauldian feminist
Ladelle McWhorter: "The work of style is the artistry with which we
live our lives. We can't just say no to sexual regimes; if we want to
undermine the regimes of power and knowledge that oppress and
threaten to dominate us, we have to cultivate a new way of life that
stands counter to them and eventually that is just other to them. And
that is a matter of the deliberate cultivation of style."[63]
The third advantage of Foucault's late aesthetics for feminism is that,
by emphasizing the individual character of each aesthetics of the self,
it pluralizes aesthetic resistance and individual "stylistics" of (sexual)
desire, thereby offering space to consider the differences among
feminisms as a resource rather than a weakness or a threat.
Differently expressed, in Foucault's terms, there need not be a
coherent subject of sexual politics (universal 'Woman'), nor need
there be any essential connection between an individual's sexual
practices and one's gender identity (or its aesthetic performing).
Sexual identity and the self can rather be understood in terms of the
diversity and multiplicity of sexual experiences and individual styles.
This notion fits well with Jana Sawicki's suggestion that Foucault's
remarks concerning the plurality of resistances and struggles, both
within and between subjects, could be used to account for the
struggles over the differences that exist within feminism.[64] To cite
Sawicki, "Difference can be a resource insofar as it enables us to
multiply the sources of resistance to the many relations of
domination that circulate through the social field." For, as she
continues, if there is no single locus of power, "then neither is there a
central locus of resistance. Moreover, if we redefine our differences,
discover new ways of understanding ourselves and each other, then
our differences are less likely to be used against us."[65]
With similar thoughts in mind, many contemporary feminist analysts
have taken up not only the oppression of women as a large group of
people, but also the different forms of active self-government that
women might employ as individuals and as specific groups. This
stressing of individuality of resistance is extremely important, I
maintain, because without the concrete study of the specificity of
each case, women's activities as autonomous social subjects cannot
be properly understood, nor can we present (or respect) differences
among feminists.
Quite naturally, this sort of pluralist standpoint has paved the way for
new visions of feminist politics, too. Unlike the foundationalist
theories of the subject, which assume that common identity
('woman') precedes the elaboration of political interests, many
current gender theorizations view identity and the self as variable
cultural constructions, which can be practised without any stable
identity. What this also means is that female subjectivity and the self
are understood as sites of political contestation and individual acts,
which might create space for multiple transgressive practices of
"womanhood" and hence support new models of living and
alternative forms of subjection. In other words, female subjectivity is
perceived as a complexity and a site of differences, which demand
active re-creation and repetition, and therefore remain open to
change.
So conceived, the female subject is allowed to have a unique relation
not only to feminist politics but also to the body, pleasure and

sexuality. As a result, many feminists have ceased searching for
universally valid feminine aesthetics and emphasize instead the
multiple possibilities embedded in one's being a woman - or, perhaps
better, in the aesthetic creating of each female self and sexuality.
Instead of speaking of specific feminine sexuality and aesthetics, a
discourse through which thinkers such as Luce Irigaray and Hélène
Cixous have tried to effect changes in power relations, many
contemporary feminist intellectuals offer a plurality of pleasures that
often transgress the supposition in the "heterosexual matrix" that
female desire is grounded on the biological woman's desire for the
opposite sex (man), and vice versa. In the words of Judith
Halberstam:
"[P]leasure might be sex with a woman who looks like a boy;
pleasure might be a woman going in disguise as a man to a gay bar
in order to pick up a gay man. Pleasure might be two naked women;
pleasure might be masturbation watched by a stranger; pleasure
might be a man and a woman; but pleasure seems to be precise [. . .
] Wanting a man with a vagina or wanting to be a woman
transformed into a man having sex with other men are fairly precise
and readable desires - precise and yet not at all represented by the
categories for sexual identity we have settled for."[66]
Seen in this way, individual identity, or one's being male or female,
or feminine or masculine, is not grounded on any innate or natural
self but becomes constantly produced and re-produced in and
through different strategic cultural/aesthetic models and discursive
practices that vary historically. For Foucault, these aesthetic practices
and strategies represent power relations, which are intimately
connected to political power. At the same time, however, it is exactly
these models and aesthetic practices that may be used to disturb the
existing limits and norms imposed on individuals, assuming that they
are used creatively and in unexpected ways.
In my view, this sort of pluralism offers an interesting basis on which
to develop a feminist politics of difference, as well as a critical
feminist aesthetics of the self. The active aesthetic disturbance of the
stereotypical ways of representing and reproducing women is not, of
course, valuable only for its own sake. In the contemporary West, it
could rather be seen as one effective means of creating
representational space for different kinds of women, many of whom
do not fit the stereotypical picture. In other words, disturbing
representations of women are part of their cultural idealization and
are, in this respect, also effective political tools, because they have
the power to challenge the look of the perceiver and show things
otherwise. With this in mind, Kaja Silverman notes, "Visual texts are
important because they have the power to re-educate the look."[67]
Last but not least, in the context of feminist philosophical aesthetics,
I maintain that Foucault's late aesthetics strengthens those countertendencies in philosophical aesthetics that have sought to overcome
the earlier limitations of "high" (Kantian) aesthetics by including in
the notion of aesthetic subjectivity the "lower" dimensions of human
existence such as sexuality, affectiveness, desire, and the body.
Because of the fact that it is exactly these aspects of subjectivity that
have been excluded from philosophical mainstream definitions of
aesthetic subjectivity (as "feminine" or "female" characteristics, in
contrast to the idealization of "disinterested" male rationality), it is, in
an important sense, these very aspects that are also of great use in
attempts to deconstruct the theoretical tools and methods of
aesthetic research to better meet the challenges of contemporary
critical thinking and art.
9. Culte de moi and the question of gender
Despite the importance of Foucault's ideas in reconsidering notions of
the self, identity and sexuality, his late writings on the aesthetics of

the self have also been the subject of heated debate, not least
among feminist intellectuals. One major line of criticism that has
been levelled at Foucault's work is that he ignores the gendered
nature of the philosophical tradition of the aesthetics of the self, and
that this has resulted in certain gender blindness in his theory. As
various feminist critiques have pointed out, in his inquiries Foucault
re-creates a model of self-mastery that depends on a struggle to
subordinate the feminine characteristic of immoderation to the male
body and self and that (unlike the female body and self) also
becomes a locus of artistic creation. This seems to be true not only of
his late work on the ancient Greco-Roman aesthetics of the self,
presented in the two last parts of his History of Sexuality (The Use of
Pleasure) 1985/1984 and The Care of the Self, 1986/1984), but also
of his essay on the Enlightenment, in which he connects the ancient
theme of the aesthetics of the self to Kant's and Baudelaire's notions
of modernity.
As I have shown, Baudelaire came to represent for Foucault some
sort of idealized aesthetic male icon - an icon representing modern
attitudes and the active individual (dandy) who attempts to turn his
life into a site of art. In brief, Foucault considers dandyism an
example of a specifically modern attitude ( culte de moi), which is
characterized by the willingness to make one's body, behavior,
passions and existence a work of art. Like his earlier interest in
avant-garde literature, in which Foucault turned toward mad male
thinkers and mad male artists, his late interest in arts of living was
also restricted to transgressive male figures and their sexual
liberation.
The lack of female examples is not the most serious problem in
Foucault's interpretation of the modern aesthetics of the self,
however. I contend that what is even more problematic is the fact
that he misses - or actively ignores - the fact that for Baudelaire and
many other "modern" male thinkers a dandy is by definition the
opposite of a woman In other words, just as in ancient theories of the
self, in which femininity and self-government are largely taken as
opposite conceptions, in Baudelaire there is a deep structural
opposition between women and dandies, and the two cannot be
brought together within his theoretical order.[68]
This is well evidenced in Baudelaire's early definition of a dandy,
which places a strict opposition between the terms 'dandy' (artificial,
pure beauty) and 'woman' (something natural and sexually
uncontrolled). In his own words:
"A woman is the opposite of dandy. Therefore, she is horrible. A
woman is hungry and she wants to eat, she's thirsty and wants to
drink. She is in heat and wants to be fucked. [. . .] A woman is
natural, that is, she is disgusting [ abominable]. Therefore, she is
always vulgar. . .."[69]
For Baudelaire, women's sexuality represented something
questionable and even horrifying, which he, just like the Greek male
thinkers read by Foucault, rather associated with immoderation and
the drive for instant pleasure than with individual self-government.
Moreover, Baudelaire differentiated the aesthetic enjoyment men
might feel when observing women from what they feel when the
observing the aesthetic appearance of dandies. In his view, the
female body is aesthetically imperfect by nature and thus it cannot,
cause pure aesthetic enjoyment, as perfect male bodies do.[70] In
short, for Baudelaire, the word 'dandy' implied beauty and high
intelligence at the same time, while female beauty was fragile,
decorative and part of a whole that is "stupide peut-être" (possibly
stupid).[71]
Furthermore, what Baudelaire's texts show is that it is his text itself
that constructs the notion of woman across the fictive map of urban

spaces, in other words, the spaces of modernity.[72] As a result of
this productive imagining of the sign 'woman,' women are excluded
from the category of active aesthetic subjects and are suppressed by
the logic of the same (male rationality). In other words, female
otherness, not to mention alternative forms of women's lives and
loves, is not appreciated or even recognized as a positive value in
Baudelaire's male-centred modernity. Perhaps partly due to this,
Baudelaire does not appreciate at all the androgynous character of
dandies as characteristic of women. Quite the contrary: he refers to
the well-dressed female dandies of Parisian cafés as manifestations of
"narcissism and stupidity," despising their modern aesthetic
appearance.[73]
The strict structural opposition between a woman and a dandy is also
manifest in his statement that female dandies do not exist because
women who dress and act like dandies "do not think," nor do they
contemplate the crowds and city streets in the ways in which a "true
flâneur" does. This is, in fact, all he has to say about the
transgressive aesthetics of the self of his female contemporaries!
As Griselda Pollock points out, Baudelaire's texts on dandyism are
marked by an opposition between the home and the outside space of
freedom in which there is liberty to look without being watched or
even recognized in the act of looking. This space is the imagined
freedom of the voyeur, of the flâneur /dandy/modern artist.[74]
However, as Janet Wolff argues, it is clearly reserved for male
agents. Hence, there is no female equivalent of the masculine figure
of the flâneur /dandy - or, perhaps better, there is not and could not
be a female flâneuse. [75]
Throughout his writings, Baudelaire also repeats a common
presupposition of his era concerning the oppositional nature of
women and intelligence. As Frédéric Monneyron comments, mid
nineteenth-century aesthetic misogyny in France reflected in this
respect the conceptions of women developed by eighteenth century
philosophers such as Arthur Schopenhauer, Immanuel Kant and
Edmund Burke.[76]
Reduced to the roles of mothers, wives, mistresses and passive
aesthetic objects, women found that their only available tasks were
to please the male eye, to love men and to take care of their
children. Being introduced as belonging to the uncontrolled nature
that modern enlightened men are to overcome, women remain
victims of the dualism of enlightenment thinking. In other words,
they are not included in the program of individual liberation, but are
positioned on the reverse side of the process of enlightenment.
Sigfried Weigel crystallizes this problem in her Body- and ImageSpace in the following passage, which is worth citing in full:
"[W]hen it comes to [...] women's desire for a subject position, and
to a speaking position located as it were on the reverse side of
enlightenment, it soon becomes tangible how the dialectic is then set
into motion in such a way that it is not easy to gain a secure
foothold. For women cannot simply be turned into, or declared to be,
the obverse. Any attempt to make up lost ground in terms of the
self-realization hitherto denied her or to reduce the male subject's
head start in the process of enlightenment would have far more
serious consequences for women than the detrimental effects of
progress as attested by and for man. Whereas for man the process
and practices of laying claim and subjugating Nature were largely
carried out on the material and the images of the other, and above
all of the other sex, for women this work on the process of civilization
would affect what is her own: mater-materia, the mastering and
rationalization of which is the prime goal of the preservation of
selfhood; the woman's body as the skandalon of a rationally oriented
history. The sacrificial structure of the history of the enlightenment

not only repeats itself more corporeally and closer to the bone, as it
were, in the female subject, but women at the same time also have a
share in both the reverse and the observe sides."[77]
As a result of this repressive logic, the female variant of the dialectic
of enlightenment (in addition to Reason and Other) introduces what
might be described as a third position. This position is highly
unstable, however, due to the fact that it must maintain relations
with both sides of the dialectic, that is, with both reason and the
Other (nature).
The position of the female subject is thus far more complicated than
that of the male. It also introduces a doubly-reversed perspective in
the sense that the perception and speech of the second sex wish to
occupy the position of the first but cannot simply shake off its
provenance from the dark reverse side. The complexity of this
constellation also seems to constantly elude conceptual
articulation.[78] In this respect, as Weigel further observes, what the
tradition of enlightenment seems to be in need of is the introduction
of a polyperspectival and topographical dimension to dialectical
thinking.
Given the above notions, Foucault's choice of Baudelaire and, to
some degree, Kant as the spokespersons of the experience of
modernity is problematic in that this experience is clearly gendered.
Following the traditional lines of white male aesthetics of the self,
Foucault, just like most of his male predecessors, comes to ignore
the question of the female other.
In my view, one of the most serious ethical and political problems in
his aesthetics of the self derives from this fact. In other words,
despite his stress on multiplicity, difference and discontinuity,
Foucault takes it for granted that his reading of the history of the
aesthetics of the self is primarily from the free-white-male
perspective. Moreover, he never practices self-interrogation or offers
a critique of the racial, class and gender biases in his own theorizing,
and consequently various other others also remain largely invisible to
his thinking. Because of these problems, it seems justifiable to say
that Foucault's theorizations of the modern aesthetics of the self
clearly remain in the tradition of white-male-centred thinking.
Consequently, Foucault never properly considers the question of what
not-male-centred versions of aesthetics of the self might be like.
Furthermore, he also ignores the fact that women's problems have
been very different in questions concerning aesthetic self-creation, as
well as in their experiences of individual sexual selves and pleasures.
Perhaps partly as a result of this, he excludes from consideration all
those alternative texts that present women's viewpoints on erotic
relations and "styles of loving," such as the one presented by
Sappho, the ancient Greek poet.[79]
In sum, the critical comments I have presented above are important
because they imply that not all philosophically valid aesthetic
practices of the self are simply exercises in freedom or critical
politics, as Foucault seems to suggest. Some might also support the
maintenance of gender hierarchies and even political practices of
exclusion. Therefore, we should not be content with the theoretical
celebration of an individual aesthetics of the self and freedom, but
should give special attention to various practical limitations
individuals might face, depending on their gender, ethnicity, class
and sexual identity. In my view, it is specifically here that we must
interrupt and disturb Foucault's theorizations and add to his agenda
at least some traits of the historical female voices that are kept silent
in his inquiries.
10. Conclusion
As I have suggested in this article, in the context of modernity,

Foucault's aesthetics of the self is a specific theoretical constellation.
Preoccupied with the same urge for historicism and engagement as
both Kant and Baudelaire, but working at the same time in the
context of ancient theories of the aesthetics of the self, he repeats
the same question that Kant and Baudelaire both posed in ways that
were typical of their own eras: What is our own time and how are we
to constitute ourselves as subjects in its conditions?
Yet, the suggestions Foucault offers do not repeat the views of Kant
or Baudelaire but rather present a new version of enlightenment
rationality and modernity. Moreover, with respect to Kant, I propose
that, to the degree that Baudelaire and Foucault both attempt to turn
the life and body of an individual into a transgressive site of a living
artwork, they do not merely continue the tradition of Kant's
philosophical Enlightenment (Aufklärung), they also turn it into a
program of exceeding (Aufhebung), that is, of exceeding the limits of
the autonomous spheres of aesthetics, ethics and politics, as well as
those between the high (rational, universal) and the low (passionate,
bodily, historically engaged).
What remains of the project of enlightenment in Foucault's late
aesthetics is a critical "ontology of ourselves," which has to be
considered not as a theory, a doctrine, or a permanent body of
knowledge that is accumulating, but far more as an ethos and an
attitude - a philosophical life in which "the critique of what we are is
at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are
imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going
beyond them," as Foucault suggests.[80] So conceived, the
reconsideration of the subject in the context of Enlightenment
thought also provides some interesting tools for feminist attempts to
rethink the subject in terms of autonomous self-government,
multiplicity and active resistance.
Yet, as I have demonstrated, when these "Foucauldian" ideas are
considered in the context of feminist thought, it is crucial to pose the
critical question: Whose body and self is it that is free to change its
aesthetic appearance at will and to affect others through this selfcreation? Alternatively, whose aesthetics of the self is taken in each
theory as presenting an ideal case? Is this self gendered? Does it
belong to some specific class and ethnicity? This sort of pluralizing
and politicising of the theory of aesthetics of the self is crucial, I
maintain, because without it we are in danger of romanticizing our
ideals of the aesthetics of the self, and of ignoring its potentially
oppressive aspects.
Moreover, along with Susan Bordo, I suggest that true resistance to
the normalizing directives demands nothing less than personal risktaking in terms of making one's self different in practice and not just
in being radical or subversive in textual play.[81] In other words, the
subversions of dominant cultural practices happen much more easily
on the textual level than in the world of true everyday human
interaction, in which the repression is real.[82] What this means,
finally, is that subversive aesthetic practices of the self are possible,
although not easy or safe.
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